Wednesday, November 7, 2007

Morgan, Post 10

Morgan Frost

1.) From the first reaction to Roe vs. Wade up until Pensacola, the anti-abortion movement escalated in its aggressiveness. The initial reaction was one of shock, where the already existing middle-aged anti-abortionists used “timid” and slow tactics of lobbying the state house; but younger people were incited to take immediate action. The type of action they took followed the “1960s traditions of social protest” and civil disobedience (Risen 39). John O’Keefe heralded in civil anti-abortion protest, emulating the peaceful styles of Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr. He also made connections to the national debate of the Vietnam War, and saw that the successful “sit-ins, arrests, (and) building takeovers” could be used for the anti-abortion purpose as well.

Then violence was coming into the scene. “In the late 1970s, anti-abortion violence was limited to sporadic and amateurish fires that did little damage” (Risen 74). But even peace advocates could not deny the success the more violent protests were having (Risen 75). As the number of protestors being recruited rose, screening of these people declined, and those who supported violence were becoming integrated within the mass with those who didn’t. The movement began to be led by “newly militant Christian fundamentalists,” and “a new, religious-based social protest movement was born” (Risen 39). Soon bombings broke out in abortion clinics—executed at night so ass not to harm anyone. Finally the idea of violence crossed the line of destruction on to murder, with the murder of abortionist John Britton by anti-abortion radical Paul Hill in 1994 in Pensacola, FL (Risen 362-3).

As we can see, there were four major causes of these changes: religious motives, information dissemination by the media, successful results, and a lack of negative consequences. Religious motives caused such an escalation as fundamentalists began to take center stage, and (as seen in section 2) they used their adherence to religion as justification for more violent methods of protest. The media constantly depicted protests both non-violent and violent. One pivotal moment was the coinciding civil sit-in and the bombing at the same place on the same weekend. Bray’s bombing partner, Spinks, bombed the Wheaton clinic the day after O’Keefe and Hand led a sit-in. The two were immediately connected, and “it was becoming harder for the public and the media to tell the difference between leaders like O’Keefe…and the bombers themselves” (Risen 94). Hand-in-hand with media portrayal was the success of the violence. As these stories reached broader audiences through the media, others were motivated to mimic the actions of others that worked successfully toward their cause. All of this was done without much fear of consequences. The security on the anti-abortion movement was below par, as the problems were deemed “not serious enough to trigger...an investigation by the FBI,” and instead the responsibility was placed on ATF. This security proved to be less powerful, and investigations reached conclusions more slowly than would have been possible with FBI involvement (Risen 93).

2.) McVeigh and Sikkink’s article argues that certain factors make Protestants approve of “contentious actions.” Apply their analysis to one of the individuals you have reads about in Risen and Thomas: Michael Bray, Joan Andrews, Randall Terry, Michael Griffin, or Paul Hill.

Michael Bray is a prime example of the conclusion made by McVeigh and Skikkink in “God, Politics, and Protest” concerning Protestants’ approval of “contentious actions” serving as a means to reach a political goal. For Bray, this goal was a pro-life America, free of abortion clinics. With his religious background, he possessed all the “tools” necessary for justifying the actions he took toward achieving his goal. McVeigh and Sikkink recognize what Smith says about religion, that it provides people with “an independent and privileged position to act…back upon the mundane world.” This means religious people can believe their religion gives them the right to impose their beliefs upon society; Michael Bray used his beliefs specifically to “legitimate the contentious tactics of protest” against abortion (McVeigh 1429-30).

Michael Bray was deeply influenced by the Calvinist work of Knox, who held the conviction “that it was appropriate for the godly man to take the law into his own hands, because his hands were the tools of the Lord.” This encompassed the utilization of “tools of politics as well as weapons of war” to be used by “members of the ‘elect’—anyone saved by God through faith—…to ‘(rebel) against idolatrous and tyrannical sovereigns’” (Risen 82). For Bray this meant not only attending protests, but expressing his dissent in such ways as performing and conducting secret bombings of abortion clinics. He believed that “abortion was murder; a sin against God” (Risen 83).

Here we see Michael Bray as an illustration of the cultural defense theory, where protesting was a “response to a challenge to deeply held beliefs and values that are rooted in the participants’ religion.” Since Bray believed abortion was a sin, anyone and anything in support of abortion was a sinner, and threatened his beliefs. McVeigh and Sikkink identify with this in their argument “that those who do perceive that their religious values are being threatened are likely to view the use of contentious tactics as a legitimate defensive strategy” (McVeigh 1431). Bray’s defensiveness even extends beyond his religious motives. This is evident when he chose the Hillcrest Clinic as the next bombing target on the grounds that “its owner had just filed a lawsuit against local picketers” (Risen 87). Under Bray’s religious stance other opinions have developed in his oppositional binary of religion against any contradictions, as shown by picketers against their target.

With such conceptual conflicts breeding under the umbrella of his fundamentalism, Bray also defines the case McVeigh and Sikkinks offer on moral absolutism. These authors recognize the “schema of God vs. world” produced by religion, where those who follow God can carry out his work onto the world. This idea “becomes for the moral absolutist a frame for contentious action” when the “behavior of other groups or individuals (are) in opposition to their own values” (McVeigh 1432). Bray holds his own beliefs to be the absolute morals which he should enforce upon the world in the name of God. He even regards his beliefs so highly that other people of his religion who do not agree in his “’high’ view of Scriptures” possess a “’low’ view,” and are thus below the absolute frame of morals. Bray even accuses the Reverend Ericksen of his own church of sinning because he does not teach fundamentalist “high” views on the Scripture (Mcveigh 84).

As Michael Bray demonstrates these analyses on Protestants and their conduciveness to “contentious acts,” he also receives the benefits McVeigh and Sikkinks highlight as being the benefit of a person’s organizational affiliation. These authors note that “participation in religious activities can also increase an individual’s exposure to social movement activists and recruiters. Organized religion provides a ripe target for activists practicing bloc recruitment” (McVeigh 1433). Once Michael Bray joined up with O’Keefe and Hand in the Pro-Life Nonviolent Action Project, he “took full advantage of his new ties…to aid Spinks in his bombings, through both intelligence gathering and the recruitment of potential accomplices” (Risen 89). As a result of being involved with this religiously driven organization, Bray was able to acquire the resources available for further participation in “contentious acts.”

3.) Risen and Thomas’s account of the Pensacola bombings is imbued with a disapproving tone. It is clear that these authors do not support the bombings as an ideal method of fighting abortion. In their description they frequently use words with more or less obviously negative connotations such as “propaganda,” “convinced,” “conconspirators,” and “exploit” (Risen 198-199). They even ridicule Goldsby and Simmons, saying “they might as well have taken out an advertisement” (Risen 199). This display gives the audience a look at the bombers as criminals, and the conclusion that their actions are not justified.

Source

The New York Times presents this story in an objective surface tone, but with a subjective perspective latent in the structure. Taking a neutral position as what is expected of a piece of news, the author presents both sides with equal amounts of information and quoted advocates. Actual subjectivity can be drawn from the order that the cases are presented and from the final sentence of the story. Since the opinion of those in support of the bombings was presented first, those opposed come across as having a rebuttal to shut down the original argument. This structure favors non-supporters as they have the last word and the chance to remark on the contents of the first comment. Also, the last sentence stating that the men “had constructed the bomb on Mr. Goldsby’s kitchen table” is belittling to the bombers (NYT). This statement leaves readers with the image of two ignorant people creating the destructive item in their own home like some kind of cartoon comedy where sticks of dynamite are held together with bubble gum. The statement may be true, but the information is not necessary. Instead it serves to make a point about the bombers; a point from a condescending and disapproving perspective.

(Due to lack of visual resources of this particular abortion clinic bombing, pictures are from a different bombing, but still represent the anti-abortionist motive as the building bombed was an abortion clinic)

Source 1

Source 2

The pictures of the bombing are also objective in that they display the actual damage done to the clinic after the explosion. Anti-abortionists, however, can argue that these pictures support the abortionist’s side because it sends a negative portrayal. They may claim that by only showing the negative affects of destroying an abortion clinic, the positive side is unaccounted for but not nonexistent. The argument in support of the bombing would need a visual that illustrates the point that the result of this building’s destruction is a decrease in murders (abortions) performed. More complicated images or textual evidence would be necessary to communicate this, though; and so whether the images hold an opinion or not, they are still the most readily available visual in depicting the direct consequence of damage to the building.

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